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Abstract
We consider an overlapping-generations economy with money rationalized through a
cash-in-advance constraint and heterogeneous agents subject to nonlinear taxation of
labor income and linear taxation of commodity purchases. Some agents are more pro-
ductive and more nancially connected than others leading to their earning more income
and requiring a proportionately smaller cash reserve to mediate their expenditures. We
show that a nonlinear income tax can always fully neutralize the redistributive impli-
cations of who gets the extra money. On the other hand, with di¤erences in nancial
connectedness, the tax policy cannot neutralize the redistributive implications of the
monetary growth rate. Nevertheless the Friedman rule is found to be often desirable
as a corner solution without having to impose arbitrary restrictions on the structure of
agentspreferences. At the same time, the di¤erences in connectedness may result in
the violation of the Friedman rule.
JEL classication: D82; E52; H21.
Keywords: Monetary policy, scal policy, redistribution, the Friedman rule, second best.
1 Introduction
This paper attempts to shed light on two inter-related questions. One is the redistrib-
utive properties of monetary policy; the other concerns the optimality of the Friedman
rule (hereafter FR) of setting the nominal interest rate to zero (Friedman 1969). The
two questions are related in that the monetary policy a¤ects redistribution through
the monetary growth rate as well as money disbursement rule. The setting that we
consider is a Mirrleesian optimal tax framework wherein available tax instruments are
rationalized by what are considered the most realistic assumptions about the structure
of information in the economy. The novelty of our approach is to allow for two sources
of heterogeneity among agents. In addition to di¤erences in earning abilities, which is
the hallmark of Mirrleesian models, we allow agents to di¤er in the degree of sophisti-
cation in handling of, and access to, nancial markets. Additionally, we do not make
any arbitrary assumptions about the individualsstructure of preferences.
The question of redistributive properties of monetary policy is important not only
in its own right but also to the resolution of the debate regarding the impropriety of
giving redistributive power, which should reside with the legislature, to unelected central
bankers. In considering the Mirrleesian approach to address the optimality of the FR, we
follow da Costa and Werning (2008). Their paper represents a refreshing break from the
traditional public nance approach to this question which typically studies the problem
in environments with identical individuals. Such environments are, by construct, silent
on the validity of FR when monetary policy has redistributive implications.1 Naturally
too, these earlier studies use a Ramsey tax setting and assume that all tax instruments,
including the income tax, are set proportionally.2 Yet, while recognizing the signicance
of heterogeneity in studying the FR, da Costa andWerning (2008) focus on heterogeneity
1With the exception of intergenerational redistributive issues that arise in overlapping generations
models; see, e.g., Weiss (1980), Abel (1987), and Gahvari (1988).
2See, e.g., Chari et al. (1991, 1996), Correia and Teles (1996, 1999), Guidotti and Vegh (1993),
Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1997), and De Fiore and Teles (2003).
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in productivities in the labor market but ignore other sources of heterogeneity that are
potentially important in this context.
One source is the distinction that Williamson (2008) has made between connected
and unconnectedagents in terms of their access to and reliance on nancial institu-
tions. He shows that this kind of heterogeneity causes monetary policy to have signi-
cant redistributive implications which, in turn, often leads to a negation of the FR. Yet,
Williamson does not frame this distinction within an optimal tax framework. As such
it is di¢ cult to draw any conclusions for the e¤ects of this type of heterogeneity on the
validity of the FR within an optimal tax setting. The current paper is a rst attempt
at studying and providing an answer to this question.
In da Costa and Wernings (2008) Mirrleesian framework, the FR emerges either
as an interior or as a corner solution. To put these results in perspective, one should
consider that the FR is a rst-best prescription which may or may not hold in second-
best settings. This depends on the nature of the second-best (existence of distortionary
taxes or intrinsic reasons for market failure), the set of tax instruments available to the
government, and the structure of individualspreferences.3 Chari et al. (1991, 1996),
in the context of a model with identical and innitely-lived individuals, related the
optimality of FR in the presence of distortionary taxes to the uniform commodity tax
result of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1972) and Sandmo (1974). This latter result states that
if preferences are separable in labor supply and non-leisure goods, with the subutility
3Among other authors, Bloise and Polemarchakis (2006), Ireland (2003), and Rochon and Pole-
marchakis (2006) showed that zero nominal interest rates constitute a necessary condition for Pareto
optimality. The optimality of the FR when lump-sum taxes are not available is more controversial.
The non-optimality of the FR in the presence of distortive taxes was rst discussed by Phelps (1973).
Cunha (2008) investigates whether zero nominal interest rates constitute a feature of optimal policies
associated with complete and incomplete tax systems (where a tax system is dened incomplete if the
number of tax instruments is smaller than the number of wedges). A selective reference to other sources
of distortion include: van der Ploeg and Alogoskous (1994) for an externality underlying endogenous
growth; Ireland (1996) for monopolistic competition; Erceg et al. (2000) and Khan et al. (2003) for
nominal wage and price settings; Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004a,b) for imperfections in the goods
market; Lai and Chin (2010) for imperfections in the (world) capital markets; and Shaw et al. (2006)
for imperfect competition as well as externality.
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for goods being homothetic, optimal commodity taxes are proportionately uniform.
Deviations from the FR violates this tax principle.4
As with Chari et al.s (1991, 1996) earlier result, da Costa and Wernings (2008)
nding is also related to the uniform taxation result in public nance, albeit a di¤erent
one. Whereas Chari et al.s (1991, 1996) draws on Sandmos tax uniformity (1974)
result derived within a Ramsey setting, da Costa and Wernings (2008) has its roots
in Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976). That classic paper on the design of tax structures
was particularly concerned with the usefulness of commodity taxes in the presence of
a general income taxes in many-consumer economies.5 It proved that with a general
income tax, if preferences are weakly separable in labor supply and non-leisure goods,
commodity taxes are not needed as instruments of optimal tax policy. The preference
separability implies a zero nominal interest rate and underlies da Costa and Wernings
(2008) result as an interior solution.
With non-separability, one wants to tax the goods that are substituteswith labor
supply and subsidize those that are complementswith labor supply.6 da Costa and
Werning assume that real cash balances and labor supply are complements so that cash
balances should be subsidized. This implies that the optimal nominal interest rate is
4This uniformity result is derived within the context of the traditional one-consumer Ramsey prob-
lem. As such, the result embodies only e¢ ciency considerations. Redistributive goals play no role.
5The ine¤ectiveness of commodity taxes and their proportionately uniform tax treatment boil down to
the same thing. In the absence of exogenous incomes, the government has an extra degree of freedom in
setting its income and commodity tax instruments. This is because all demand and supply functions are
homogeneous of degree zero in consumer prices and lump-sum income. In consequence, the government
can, without any loss of generality, set one of the commodity taxes at zero (i.e. set one of the commodity
prices at one). Under this normalization, uniform rates imply absence of commodity taxes.
6The result is based on the normalassumption that the socially desirable direction of redistribution
goes from high-skilled to low-skilled agents. The substitutability/complementarity relationships allow
commodity taxes/subsidies to weaken otherwise binding self-selection constraints. As Stiglitz (2015,
p. 42) writes: what the AtkinsonStiglitz theorem illustrates is that in the presence of an (optimal)
income tax, ... commodity taxation can be viewed as a particular type of Pigouvian corrective tax. The
focus is not on the impact on tax revenues, or even directly on dead weight losses (as usually conceived),
but on impacts on the self-selection constraints that are central to the design of the optimal income
tax. Looseningthe self-selection constraints has a rst order e¤ect on welfare, while the distortions
associated with small commodity taxation have a second order e¤ect on welfare.
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negative. But given the non-negativity of nominal interest rate, the FR emerges as the
optimalpolicy. The question then is what justies da Costa and Wernings comple-
mentarity assumption. The justication appears to come from the notion, stressed
by various theories, that moneys liquidity services facilitate transactions and save on
the time required for purchases (da Costa and Werning, 2008, p. 83). However, the
chosen complementarity assumption does not lead to or explain the empirical regularity
found in the literature to the e¤ect that the lower income consumers carry a higher
percentage of their expenditures in cash.7 Indeed, as Albanesi (2007) points out, the
complementarity assumption exploited by da Costa and Werning would lead to a cross-
sectional distribution of money holdings that is inconsistent with empirical evidence
(p. 38). And, without recourse to this assumption, the optimality of the FR remains
questionable.
We account for the negative cross-sectional correlation between money holdings and
labor income by explicitly modeling it as the outcome of the connectednesshetero-
geneity that Williamson (2008) proposed while remaining agnostic about the structure
of individuals preferences (i.e. complementarity or substitutability of real balances
with labor supply). As Williamson pointed out, individuals relying more on nancial
instruments, require to carry less cash to nance their transactions. One can think of
two mechanisms for the ability to fully exploit nancial institutions. One is a persons
actual income level. There is abundant empirical evidence that wealthier people, in
developed and developing countries alike, have wider access to nancial institutions;
see, e.g., Johnson and Sherraden (2007). A second mechanism that likely plays a role is
an individuals nancial acumen(by which we mean both ones innate ability in this
7See, e.g., Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (2000), Erosa and Ventura (2002), and Guiso et al. (2001). The
complementarity assumption only tells us that if a high-ability consumer and a low-ability consumer
were to earn the same gross-of-tax income and the same net-of-tax income, the high-ability consumer
(whose labor supply is lower since his wage rate is higher) would carry a smaller amount of real cash
balances than the low-ability consumer. It does not tell us if, in equilibrium, a high-ability person
(earning a higher income than a low-ability individual) will in fact carry a smaller amount of real cash
balances, as a percentage of his total expenditures, than a low-ability consumer.
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particular dimension as well as ones nancial literacy).8 Indeed, Johnson and Sher-
raden (2007) recognize and document both of the two mechanisms mentioned under
access to nancial institutions and servicesand nancial knowledge(with the two
elements forming what they call nancial capability).9 Similarly, in its Policy Brief
(July 2006), the OECD reports that The information available on consumer nancial
literacy is worrying; it further adds that The level of nancial literacy tends to vary
according to education and income levels, but the evidence shows that highly educated
consumers with high incomes can be just as ignorant about nancial issues as less edu-
cated, lower income consumers.10 Naturally, one expects ones nancial acumen to be
positively correlated with ones earning ability and productivity.11
Modeling di¤erences in nancial connectedness directly, obviates the need to import
forced assumptions that will have their own artifacts. Indeed, if moneys liquidity
services facilitate transactions and save on the time required for purchases, as da
Costa and Werning (2008) argue, one would expect the rich and more able individuals
to want to carry relatively more cash, not less. Their time is after all more valuable and
productive than the poor and less-able individuals.
To model nancial connectedness as a second source of heterogeneity, we rationalize
money holdings through a Clower cash-in-advance constraint that allows for the cash
reserve requirement to di¤er across agents. Individuals who are more nancially sophis-
ticated are postulated to require a smaller fraction of their expenditures to be nanced
through cash reserves. This fraction is also assumed to vary inversely with ones earned
8Mirrleesian models, being static in nature, do not explicitly model the role that education plays in
the outcome. In postulating that earnings are simply the product of earning ability and e¤ort (labor
supply), one subsumes the role of education in ones innate abilities(boosting it up).
9That nancial sophistication is not identical to access is supported by other type of evidence as
well. For example, Kotliko¤ and Bernheim (2001) report that having an allowance and a bank account
in childhood leads to more savings in adulthood.
10The Policy Brief also mentions that OECD is advancing a project entitled Improving Financial
Literacyand has suggested ten specic guidelines for improving nancial literacy.
11Of course, given that in equilibrium higher earning abilities are translated into higher earnings, the
two mechanisms are interrelated. Yet, as we will see later in Section 6, the two are not the same and
each has its own distinct implication.
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income.12
Another di¤erence between our setup and the one considered by da Costa and Wern-
ing (2008) is that we use an overlapping-generations (hereafter OLG) framework instead
of an innitely-lived cohort of agents. This allows us avoiding certain technical di¢ cul-
ties while concentrating on our main points. However, as the golden rule literature
has taught us, in the OLG models one can always exploit the di¤erence between the real
interest rate and the population growth rate to raise the steady-state welfare through
intergenerational wealth transfers.13 Distortionary commodity taxes achieve this. An
ination tax, i.e. deviating from the FR, is one such mechanism.14 However, this reason
for the suboptimality of the FR has nothing to do with the heterogeneity of agents or
with the existence of Mirrleesian taxes (the issues of interest in this paper). Thus, to
avoid distraction caused by this obvious source of suboptimality, when discussing the
optimality of the FR in our setup, we shall assume that the economy is at the golden
rule.
A number of lessons emerge from our analysis. First, regarding the role of income
and commodity taxes, we distinguish between two monetary mechanisms that can a¤ect
redistribution. One concerns who gets the extra money. The other is associated with the
rate of growth of money supply. We show that a nonlinear income tax can always neu-
tralize the rst mechanism. On the other hand, the tax policy can neutralize the second
redistributive channel only in the absence of di¤erences in nancial connectedness.
Second, absent di¤erences in nancial connectedness, we show there is instrument
12We nd the cash-in-advance constraint formulation to be the simplest mechanism for introducing a
second source of heterogeneity into the model. This is in contrast to da Costa and Werning (2008) who
rationalize money holdings via introducing real cash balances in the agents utility functions. These
reduced-form formulations are the literatures two most commonly used environments for studying
the optimality of the FR.
13The terminology and the original formulation of the golden rule, in the context of the neoclassical
growth model, is due to Phelps (1961). For discussions in the context of OLG model, see, among others,
Diamond (1965) and Hamada (1972).
14This result was rst demonstrated by Weiss (1980). Later, Gahvari (1988) showed that the existence
of generation-specic lump-sum taxes makes the use of such distortionary taxes unnecessary and restores
the optimality of the FR.
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over-determination. That is, the optimal monetary growth rate is not unique; a
continuum of values satises it (supported by o¤setting tax instruments). To have a
unique optimal monetary growth rate, commodity taxation must be ruled out. Under
this circumstance, the FR holds as a unique interior solution if preferences are separable
in labor supply. It will also hold as a corner solution if labor supply and second-period
consumption are complements.
Third, with di¤erences in nancial connectedness, the over-determinacy disappears
and the optimal policy is characterized by a unique commodity tax rate and a unique
monetary growth rate. Provided that labor supply and second-period consumption are
substitutes, it might then be optimal to violate the FR. However, for this to happen
one also needs that the di¤erences in nancial connectedness are to a su¢ ciently large
extent explained by di¤erences in income (rather than by an underlying heterogeneity
in nancial sophistication).
2 The model
Consider a two-period OLG model wherein individuals work in the rst period and con-
sume in both. There is no bequest motive. Preferences are represented by the strictly
quasi-concave utility function U = u (ct; dt+1; Lt) where c denotes consumption in the
rst period, d consumption in the second period, and L denotes the labor supply; sub-
script t denotes calendar time. The utility function is strictly increasing in ct and dt+1,
and strictly decreasing in Lt. Each generation consists of two types of individuals who
di¤er in two (positively) correlated characteristics: earning abilities (labor productiv-
ity) and the degree of nancial sophistication. High-productivity workers are paid wht
and low-productivity workers w`t ; with w
h
t > w
`
t . The degree of nancial sophistication,
together with the income earned by a given individual, determines an agents degree of
nancial connectedness. This is modeled by the relative size of the cash one has to
carry for nancing his transactions. The proportion of agents of type j; j ; j = h; `,
7
remains constant over time. Denote the number of young agents of type j born in period
t by njt and the total number of young agents by Nt. We have n
j
t=Nt = 
j . While j
remains constant, population grows over time at a constant rate, g.
Production takes place through a linear technology with di¤erent types of labor
as inputs. Transfer of resources to the future occurs only through a storage technology
with a xed (real) rate of return, r.15 We thus work with an OLG model à la Samuelson
(1958) and assume away the issues related to capital accumulation.
2.1 Money and monetary policy
Money holdings, rationalized through a Clower cash-in-advance constraint, constitute
another source of nancing for future consumption (in addition to real savings). At
the beginning of period t; before consumption takes place, the young purchase all the
existing stock of money, Mt; from the old. Denote a young j-type agents purchases by
mjt : We have
Mt = n
h
tm
h
t + n
`
tm
`
t: (1)
The rate of return on money holdings (the nominal interest rate), it+1; is related to the
ination rate, 't+1; according to the Fisher equation
1 + it+1  (1 + r)
 
1 + 't+1

: (2)
Denote the price level at time t by pt; the ination rate is dened as
1 + 't+1  pt+1=pt: (3)
The monetary authority injects money into (or retires money from) the economy at
the constant rate of .16 The formulation below is based on the assumptionthat the
15An alternative assumption is that agents borrow and lend on international capital markets at an
exogenously xed interest rate.
16Given a positive real interest rate, in the absence of population growth,  will have to be negative
for the nominal interest rate to be zero as required by the FR. With population growth, the FR is
compatible with a positive  (as well as a negative ). Either way, the fact that the nominal interest
rate cannot be negative sets a lower bound on .
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money is given to (or taken from) the old who hold all the stock of money. Let ajt+1
denote the amount of money that a j-type agent, who purchases mjt at the beginning of
time t, receivesat the beginning of period t+ 1. Clearly, aht+1 and a
`
t+1 must satisfy
the money injection relationship,
nht a
h
t+1 + n
`
ta
`
t+1 = Mt: (4)
Beyond this, we do not specify how much of the extra money injection goes to which
type. Indeed, one message of our paper is to prove that this division is immaterial.
Following Hahn and Solow (1995), specify the cash-in-advance constraint through
the assumption that all agents must nance a certain fraction of their second-period
consumption expenditures by the cash balances saved in the rst period.17 However,
given our heterogeneous-agents framework, this fraction is allowed to depend on an
individuals type as well as on his earned income. Specically, let I denote earned income
and let j (I) denote the fraction of a j-types second-period consumption expenditures
that has to be nanced by cash balances when earning I. One can write his cash-in-
advance constraint by,18
mjt + a
j
t+1 = j (I) pt+1d
j
t+1: (5)
An interesting feature of the cash-in-advance constraint approach to modeling money
holdings is that it can be tweaked in a natural way to account for the kind of hetero-
geneity Williamson (2008) has identied. His notion of connectedness can be captured
17This specication has been used extensively in overlapping-generations models, particularly by
Philippe Michel and his associates; see, e.g., Crettez et al. (1999, 2002) and Michel and Wigniolle (2003,
2005). This specication may appear restrictive in that it does not apply to rst-period consumption
expenditures. However, this is not the case for the points addressed in this paper. Assuming that
rst-period expenditures are also subject to this constraint does not change our results. Given that
individuals have no assets in the rst-period, they will have to borrow money from the old, at the
market interest rate, and as such imposes no additional constraint on the individuals optimization
problem. See Gahvari (2012) for more details on what might change if one adopts this more generalized
specication for the cash-in-advance constraint.
18With the additional restriction that  mjt < ajt+1 < jpt+1djt+1. Observe also that mjt + ajt+1 is not
necessarily equal to (1 + g)mjt+1. This will be the case only if the money disbursement to type j is set
according to the rule ajt+1 = m
j
t .
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through di¤erences in individual characteristics and incomes. On one hand higher pro-
ductivity goes hand in hand with a higher inherent degree of sophistication on the part of
the individual, and the more sophisticated an individual, the higher his knowledge of the
nancial sector and his ability to take advantage of nancial institutions. At the same
time, the more income an individual earns, the more connectionshe makes (higher
incomes open more doors). Both of these factors appear to be behind Williamsons
concept of nancial connectedness allowing richer individuals to carry a smaller fraction
of their expenditures in cash. Put di¤erently, ` (I) > h (I), with @j(I)=@I < 0 (for
j = `; h). Moreover, since at the solution to the governments problem that we present
in Section 2.4 the high-productivity individuals earn more than the low-productivity
ones, i.e. Ih > I`, we will have that `
 
I`

> h
 
Ih

.19
2.2 Fiscal policy
Informational frictions play a key role in the Mirrleesian optimal tax approach. The
informational structure we posit is the one most commonly used in the optimal tax
literature; see, e.g., Edwards et al., (1994). In particular, we shall assume that an indi-
viduals type and labor supply are not publicly observable; hence rst-best type-specic
lump-sum taxes are not available and redistribution can be achieved only through dis-
tortionary taxation. On the other hand, individual income (It = wtLt) is observable so
that it can be taxed via a nonlinear tax schedule T (It). Moreover, we assume that the
tax administration has information on anonymous transactions but not on the identity
of the consumers. That is, the administration observes the total sales of a commodity
19 Interestingly too, our setup lends itself to a natural reinterpretation in terms of cash and credit
goods. With two consumption goods in our model, rst-period and second-period, and individuals
having to hold cash only for nancing a fraction of the second-period consumption, one can think of the
rst-period consumption good as credit goods and the second-period consumption good as part cash part
credit goods. Seen in this light, one naturally wonders about the optimality of the FR if the government
were to levy di¤erent tax rates on rst- and second-period consumption goods. As we show later in the
paper, the answer to this question depends crucially on what kind of tax instrument is available to the
government. Linear consumption taxes do not su¢ ce to make the ination tax redundant. What one
would need for this purpose is a non-linear commodity tax.
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but not who bought how much. This is the standard assumption in the literature so
much so that it has been used as part of the very denition of indirect taxation. In dis-
cussing direct versus indirect taxation, Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) write the essential
aspect of the distinction [is] the fact that direct taxes may be adjusted to the individual
characteristics of the taxpayer, whereas indirect taxes are levied on transactions irre-
spective of the circumstances of buyer or seller (p. 427). This assumption precludes
imposition of non-linear commodity taxes.20 However, linear commodity taxation is
feasible.21
When determining the linear commodity taxes, however, the homogeneity of degree
zero of demands in consumer prices and disposable incomes, implies that the tax au-
thority has one extra degree of freedom in setting the commodity tax rates. As long
as relative prices of the various goods are kept xed, any e¤ect of a proportionately
uniform increase or decrease in the vector of commodity tax rates can be o¤set via a
proper adjustment in the income tax schedule. One of the tax rates can then be set
equal to zero without any loss of generality. We set the tax rate on ct equal to zero
normalizing its consumer price to one. The tax rate on dt+1 is denoted by  . Giving
the linearity of the production technology, we also normalize all producer prices to one
(by suitable choices of measurement units).
2.3 Constrained Pareto-e¢ cient allocations
To characterize the (constrained) Pareto-e¢ cient allocations, one has to account for the
economys resource balance, the incentive compatibility (hereafter IC) constraints due
to our informational structure, and the implementability constraints caused by linearity
of commodity taxes (itself due to informational constraint) as well as the monetary
expansion mechanism. To this end, we derive an optimal revelation mechanism. For
20For completeness, we nevertheless investigate the implications of the availability of nonlinear com-
modity taxes in our model. This is discussed in Appendix C of the paper.
21The required information for this type of taxation, particularly if it is levied on producers, is indeed
public observability of anonymous transactions.
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our purpose, a mechanism consists of a set of type-specic before-tax labor incomes,
Ijt s, after-tax incomes, z
j
ts, a commodity tax rate,  , a money supply growth rate, ,
and a monetary distributive rule, ajt+1.
22 This procedure determines  ; ; and ajt+1 from
the outset. A complete solution to the optimal tax problem per se, i.e. determination of
Ijt by the individuals via utility maximization, then requires only the design of a general
income tax function T (It) such that z
j
t = I
j
t   T

Ijt

.
To proceed further, it is necessary to consider the optimization problem of an in-
dividual for a given mechanism ( ; ; at+1; zt; It). This is necessitated by the fact that
the mechanism determines personal consumption levels only indirectly, namely through
prices. The mechanism assigns the quintuple

 ; ; ajt+1; z
j
t ; I
j
t

to a young individual
who reports his type as j.23 The individual will then allocate zjt between rst- and
second-period consumption, and money holdings.
Formally, given any vector ( ; ; at+1; zt; It), an individual of type j chooses ct and
dt+1 to maximize
u = u
 
ct; dt+1;
It
wjt
!
; j = `; h; (6)
subject to the per-period budget constraints
pt (ct + st) +mt = ptzt; (7)
pt+1 (1 + ) dt+1 = ptst (1 + it+1) +mt + at+1; (8)
where st is the level of real savings chosen by the agent. Observe that  does not
explicitly appear in the problem above; it does so implicitly through its e¤ect on it+1.
Combining equations (7)(8) we can write the intertemporal budget constraint for
22Observe that the monetary authority has only two degrees of freedom in setting a`t+1; a
h
t+1 and .
Setting any two of these three variables xes the third through equation (4).
23 If the money disbursements to skilled and unskilled workers were set according to ajt+1 = m
j
t ,
then once  is determined, so will ajt+1. The revelation mechanism will then be reduced to a quadruple 
 ; ; zjt ; I
j
t

.
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the young as:24
ct +
(1 + ) dt+1
1 + r
+
it+1
1 + r
mt
pt+1
= zt +
at+1
pt+1 (1 + r)
: (9)
The problem of a young j-type, who is facing the quintuple

 ; ; ajt+1; z
j
t ; I
j
t

, is to
determine ct; dt+1, and mt to maximize (6) subject to (9) and the cash-in-advance
constraint (5). Summarizing this problem by the Lagrangian,
L = u
 
ct; dt+1;
It
wjt
!
+ 

zt +
at+1
pt+1 (1 + r)
  ct   (1 + ) dt+1
1 + r
  it+1
1 + r
mt
pt+1

+ 

mt
pt+1
+
at+1
pt+1
  jdt+1

;
the rst-order conditions are:
@L
@ct
=
@u

ct; dt+1; It=w
j
t

@ct
   = 0; (10)
@L
@dt+1
=
@u

ct; dt+1; It=w
j
t

@dt+1
  1 + 
1 + r
  j = 0; (11)
@L
@ (mt=pt+1)
=   it+1
1 + r
+  = 0: (12)
Assuming the cash-in-advance constraint (5) is binding, the above conditions yield:25
@u

ct; dt+1; It=w
j
t

=@dt+1
@u

ct; dt+1; It=w
j
t

=@ct
=
1 +  + j (It) it+1
1 + r
 qjt+1 (It) : (13)
24Substitute zt   ct  mt=pt for st from (7) into (8) to derive,
pt+1 (1 + ) dt+1 = pt

zt   ct   mt
pt

(1 + it+1) +mt + at+1
= pt+1

zt   ct   mt
pt+1
 
1 + 't+1

(1 + r) +mt + at+1:
Divide the above expression by pt+1 (1 + r) and rearrange.
25 If the constraint (5) is non-binding then  = 0 and, from (12), it+1 = 0 (because  > 0). Under this
circumstance, it+1 = 0 emerges simply as a condition for households to hold money and the question of
the optimality of the FR becomes a moot point.
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Writing the binding version of the Clower cash-in-advance constraint as,26
mjt
pt+1
= j (It) d
j
t+1  
ajt+1
pt+1
; (14)
we can incorporate (14) into the intertemporal budget constraint (9) to rewrite it as27
ct +
1 +  + j (It) it+1
1 + r
dt+1 = zt +
at+1
pt
: (15)
Condition (13) and the young j-types intertemporal budget constraint (15), using the
denition of qjt+1 in (13), yield the following conditional demands for the j-types rst-
and second-period consumption,28
cjt = c
 
qjt+1 (It) ; zt +
at+1
pt
;
It
wjt
!
; djt+1 = d
 
qjt+1 (It) ; zt +
at+1
pt
;
It
wjt
!
: (16)
The j-types holding of cash, mjt , is then determined through equation (14). These are
of course conditional on the values of  ; ; ajt+1; z
j
t ; I
j
t , j = h; `, the policy parameters to
be set by the mechanism designer.29
To complete the characterization of the set of (constrained) Pareto-e¢ cient alloca-
tions, what is left for us to specify is how the mechanism designer chooses

 ; ; ajt+1; z
j
t ; I
j
t

.
Substituting the values of cjt and d
j
t+1 in the young j-types utility function (6), yields
his conditional indirect utility function,
v
 
qjt+1 (It) ; zt +
at+1
pt
;
It
wjt
!

u
 
c
 
qjt+1 (It) ; zt +
at+1
pt
;
It
wjt
!
; d
 
qjt+1 (It) ; zt +
at+1
pt
;
It
wjt
!
;
It
wjt
!
: (17)
26Divide (5) by pt+1; rearrange the terms, and use equations (2)(3).
27Substitute for mt=pt+1; from (14) in the intertemporal budget constraint (9) to get
ct +
(1 + ) dt+1
1 + r
+
it+1
1 + r

jdt+1   at+1
pt+1

= zt +
at+1
pt+1 (1 + r)
;
then rearrange the terms.
28Observe that if there is heterogeneity in cash-in-advance constraint across the types, h 6= ` and
the two types will face di¤erent e¤ective prices for dt+1 relative to ct: qht+1 6= q`t+1.
29To be specic, equations (1)(3), equations (13)(15) for j = `; h, and the denition of qjt+1 in (13)
for j = `; h, give us eleven equations for determining cjt ;m
j
t ; d
j
t+1; q
j
t+1; it+1; 't+1; pt+1, and pt under the
perfect-foresight assumption.
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To write the IC constraints, we should also know what fraction of his second-period
consumption expenditures a j-type who may want to report his type as k; the so-called
mimicker(or jk agent), must nance through cash balances that he saves in the rst
period. This fraction, j
 
Ik

, depends on the individuals true type j as well as the
income he earns when mimicking the other type (i.e. the income Ik intended by the
planner for agents of type k only). Consistent with the denition of qjt+1 (It) in (13), a
j-type mimicking a k-type will face a price of
qjt+1

Ik

 1 +  + 
j
 
Ik

it+1
1 + r
; (18)
for his second-period consumption good. For simplicity, from now on we denote:
j  j  Ij ; jk  j Ik ; qjt+1  qj Ijt  ; qjkt+1  qj Ikt  : (19)
Let js be positive constants with the normalization
P
j=`;h 
j = 1. The mechanism
designer maximizes X
j=`;h
jv
 
qjt+1; z
j
t +
ajt+1
pt
;
Ijt
wjt
!
;
with respect to  ; ; aht+1; z
`
t ; z
h
t ; I
`
t and I
h
t ;
30 subject to the governments budget con-
straint, X
j=`;h
jt

Ijt   zjt

+

1 + r
X
j=`;h
jt+1d
j
t+1  R; (20)
the money injection relationship (4), and the IC constraints
v
 
qht+1; z
h
t +
aht+1
pt
;
Iht
wht
!
 v
 
qh`t+1; z
`
t +
a`t+1
pt
;
I`t
wht
!
; (21)
v
 
q`t+1; z
`
t +
a`t+1
pt
;
I`t
w`t
!
 v
 
q`ht+1; z
h
t +
aht+1
pt
;
Iht
w`t
!
; (22)
30As observed earlier, one needs to determine only two of the variables a`t+1; a
h
t+1 and . The third
will be determined through equation (4).
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where R is an exogenous per-capita revenue requirement.31 We will discuss the solution
to this problem, and the properties of the solution, after it reaches its steady-state
equilibrium as discussed next.
2.4 Steady state
The consumers optimization problem under perfect foresight assumption, given the
mechanism

 ; ; ajt+1; z
j
t ; I
j
t

, determines djt+1 as a function of pt and q
j
t+1. Equivalently,
given the denition of qjt+1 in (13) and using equations (2)(3), d
j
t+1 is determined as
a function of pt and pt+1. Consequently, through the binding version of (5), m
j
t too is
determined as a function of pt and pt+1.32
Now, in the per-period equilibrium of our model laid out in Section 2, the equality of
aggregate money demand and aggregate money supply at time t requires, from equation
(1), that Nt
 
hmht + 
`m`t

=Mt. Divide this relationship by Ntpt and rewrite it as,
h
mht
pt
+ `
m`t
pt
=
(1 + )Mt 1
Ntpt
: (23)
With mht and m
`
t being function of pt and pt+1, given that ;Mt 1;and Nt are all
predetermined variables, equation (23) denes a relationship between pt and pt+1. The
dynamics of the model is then described by this equation. The economy reaches a
steady-state equilibrium when pt+1 = [(1 + ) = (1 + g)] pt.33 This implies, using the
31Observe that (20) represents a generational budget constraint as opposed to a per-period budget
constraint.
32Dividing the binding version of (5) by pt results in m
j
t=pt = (
jdjt+1pt+1   ajt+1)=pt.
33Notice that with the money stock changing at the rate  in every period, Mt+1 = (1 + )Mt, or
equivalently, using eq. (1) and taking into account that the population of each type grows at a constant
rate g, X
j=`;h
njt

mjt+1  
1 + 
1 + g
mjt

= 0:
Given that the price level pt evolves over time in the same way for both types, for both m`t=pt and
mht =pt to remain constant over time (i.e. to reach a steady-state level), it must be that the ratios
m`t+1=m
`
t and m
h
t+1=m
h
t take the same value: m
`
t+1=m
`
t = m
h
t+1=m
h
t = pt+1=pt. This in turn implies
that at a steady-state the money holding of each type changes in the same direction, and therefore
mjt+1 = (1 + )m
j
t= (1 + g) :
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denition of the ination rate provided by (3), that the steady-state version of eq. (2)
is given by:
1 + i = (1 + r) (1 + ) = (1 + g) : (24)
In steady state, the mechanism designer assigns Ijt+1 = I
j
t ; Ij ; zjt+1 = zjt  zj ; and
ajt+2=pt+1 = a
j
t+1=pt  bj ; j = h; `; to whoever states his type to be j. The intertemporal
price of the second-period consumption a j-type faces, qjt+1 dened by (13), then takes
the following form
qj  1 +  + 
ji
1 + r
: (25)
Equation (16) determines the steady-state values of the consumption goods cjt = c
j
t+1 =
cj and djt = d
j
t+1 = d
j . The steady-state level of real cash balances, xjt  mjt=pt, will
then be determined from (14) and remains constant over time at34
xj =
1 + 
1 + g
jdj   bj : (26)
It follows from this expression that one can write the steady-state version of the money
Rewriting the equation above as
mjt+1
pt+1
pt+1
pt
=
1 + 
1 + g
mjt
pt
;
it follows that at a steady-state equilibrium pt+1=pt = (1 + ) = (1 + g).
34We have xjt  mjt=pt =
 
mjt=pt+1

(pt+1=pt). Substituting for m
j
t=pt+1 from (14) yields
xjt =
"
j (It) d
j
t+1  
ajt+1
pt+1
#
pt+1
pt
=
"
j (It) d
j
t+1
pt+1
pt
  a
j
t+1
pt
#
=

jdj
1 + 
1 + g
  bj

:
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injection relationship (4) as35
X
j=`;h
jbj =

1 + g
X
j=`;h
jjdj : (27)
For future reference, we also note that the steady-state version of the young j-types
intertemporal budget constraint, eq. (15), is given by
cj + qjdj = zj + bj  yj ; (28)
where yj denotes the j-types aggregate disposable income. Similarly, for a jk mimicker,
we have that the intertemporal budget constraint is given by cjk+qjkdjk = zk+bk  yk,
where
qjk  1 +  + 
jki
1 + r
: (29)
We are now ready to investigate the questions of the redistributive aspects of mon-
etary policy in the presence of Mirrleesian taxes and of the optimality of the FR.
3 Monetary policy and redistribution
This section examines the redistributive aspects of (i) how the money is injected into
the economy and (ii) the rate of money creation. The following Proposition summarizes
our results for each case.
35To see this, substitute for Mt from equation (1) into (4) and divide it by Ntpt to get,
h
aht+1
pt
+ `
a`t+1
pt
= 

h
mht
pt
+ `
m`t
pt

:
In the steady state, ajt+1=pt tends to b
j and mjt=pt to x
j , where xj = [(1 + ) = (1 + g)] jdj   bj .
Substituting in above,
hbh + `b` = 

hxh + `x`

= 
1 + 
1 + g

hhdh + ``d`

  

hbh + `b`

;
and rearranging the terms yields,
(1 + )

hbh + `b`

= 
1 + 
1 + g

hhdh + ``d`

:
Then divide this expression by (1 + ).
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Proposition 1 Consider the steady-state equilibrium of our OLG model with cash-in-
advance constraint and with heterogeneous agents:
(i) For a given monetary rate of growth, the scal authority can always o¤set the
redistributive e¤ects of who gets the extra money (or loses the money that is withdrawn
from the economy), by adjusting the nonlinear income tax.
(ii) A change in monetary growth rate changes the relative price of future to present
consumption di¤erently for di¤erent individuals. The scal authority cannot neutralize
the e¤ects of such a change in monetary policy.
Proof. To prove part (i), start from any initial value for bh and b` and consider
a change in money disbursements equal to dbh and db`: Simultaneously, change zj ac-
cording to dzj =  dbj : Now, with yj = zj + bj , dyj = 0, and  qj ; yj ; Ij ;  qjk; yk; Ik
remain intact. Hence the utility of all agents in the economy, including those planning
to behave as mimickers, remain the same. As a result, the IC constraints continue to
be satised if they were satised at the initial equilibrium.
Second, with
 
qj ; yj ; Ij

remaining unchanged, the j-types demand for d does not
change either. Consequently, the changes in bj imply, from the money injection con-
straint (27), that
hdbh + `db` =

1 + g

``dd` + hhddh

= 0: (30)
Third, with dj unchanged, the only change in the governments revenue requirement
comes from the changes in zj : Hence, from the steady-state version of (20) and (30),
dR =  

hdzh + `dz`

= hdbh + `db` = 0:
This shows that the considered changes satisfy all the constraints that the economy
faces but leaves every agent as well o¤ as he was before and completes the proof of part
(i) of the Proposition.
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Turning to part (ii) of the Proposition, now start from any initial value for  and
change the monetary growth rate by d. To determine how this changes qj , substitute
for i from (24) in (25) to get
qj =
1
1 + r
+ j

1
1 + g
  1
1 + r

+

1 + r
+
j
1 + g
: (31)
It follows from (31) that dqj  j= (1 + r) d. It is then clear that, because of di¤erent
values of j , a change in  changes qj di¤erently for individuals of di¤erent types. As
long as the government has to tax future goods at the same rate for everyone, it will be
impossible to o¤set the e¤ect of a change in  with a change in  : Consequently, this
aspect of monetary policy cannot be neutralized with scal policy.
Regarding the monetary distribution rule, it should not be surprising that it can be
rendered impotent in the presence of a nonlinear income tax. Specically, a nonlinear
income tax enables the scal authority to exert full control on z and therefore, as can
be seen from (28), on an agents aggregate disposable income. Consequently, any agent
specic money injection can be o¤set by the nonlinear income tax.36
As to the relevance of the monetary growth rate, our method of proof alerts us to
the fact that if the scal authority could tax consumption goods at di¤erent rates for
di¤erent individuals, it would be able to o¤set the change in qj to both individual types.
This would require departing from the common assumption in the optimal tax literature
that the scal authority has information only on anonymous transactions. Instead, one
would need to assume that the scal authority can observe personal purchases (who
purchased how much), so that it can levy nonlinear taxes also in the goods market.
Although the information on personal consumption levels is not typically available,
36This result does not contradict Williamsons (2008) who nds the monetary expansion rule does
matter. Nor is the two di¤erent results due to the fact that in Williamsons setup, there is no scal
authority to try to undo what the monetary authority does. The underlying factor is the distinction he
makes between the connected and unconnected agents in terms of their access to nancial institutions.
The impact of this distinction does not show up in bj in our model. Instead, this distinction works
through di¤erent s that the two types face with respect to their cash-in-advance constraints. This, in
turn, manifests itself through qj and not bj .
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for completeness, we have examined its implications in Appendix C. There we show
that with nonlinear commodity taxes the FR is optimal as a corner solution under our
assumption that ` > h`.
Finally, notice that, even though Proposition 1 and its proof refer to a steady-
state equilibrium, the presented results apply more generally also outside a steady-state
and for any pre-reform policy package, even suboptimal ones, that satisfy the set of
constraints faced by the policy maker (i.e. the constraints (4), and (20)-(22)).37
4 Optimal tax/monetary policy
To characterize the optimal tax/monetary policy, using the mechanism design approach,
we follow the common practice in the literature and ignore the upward incentive
constraint, v`  v`h; assuming that it is automatically satised.38 Thus, the only
possible binding constraint will be that of the high-skilled agents mimicking low-skilled
agents. Intuitively, this implies that we are concerned only with the realistic case of
redistribution from the high-skilled to the low-skilled agents. Focusing on the steady-
state equilibrium, the mechanism designers problem can then be represented as:
max
Ij ;zj ;bj ; ;
X
j=`;h
jv

qj ; yj ;
Ij
wj

;
subject to the governments budget constraint,X
j=`;h
j

Ij   zj + 
1 + r
dj

 R; ()
37Relaxing the assumption of a steady-state equilibrium would not alter the structure of the required
proof; it would only require a more cumbersome notation to take into account the time indices.
38Given the perfect correlation between skills and nancial sophistication, the properties of our setting
with two sources of heterogeneity reduces to that of a two-group model à la Stiglitz (1982). In particular,
the single-crossing property for the preference structure v
 
yj ; Ij=wj ; qj

will be satised in the usual
manner (i.e. by having, at any point in the (I; y)-space, the indi¤erence curve of a high-skilled agent
to be atter than the indi¤erence curve of a low-skilled agent a condition that is guaranteed if the
composite commodity yj is normal). Then there will at most be one binding self-selection constraint.
Moreover, the single-crossing property and the incentive-compatibility constraint together imply that
Ih > I`.
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the money injection relationship (27),
X
j=`;h
jbj =

1 + g
X
j=`;h
jjdj ; ()
and the IC constraint,
v

qh; yh;
Ih
wh

 v

qh`; y`;
I`
wh

; ()
where the Greek letters on the right-hand side of each constraint denotes its corre-
sponding Lagrange multiplier.39 Finally, there is also the non-negativity of the nominal
interest rate constraint, i  0. This places, from (24), a lower bound on the feasible
value of , i.e.   (g   r) =(1 + r), and can be taken care through the Kuhn-Tucker
formulation of the problem.
Given the redundancy of one of the instruments bh and b`, it is su¢ cient to carry out
our optimization with respect to only bh or b`:Without loss of generality, we choose bh.
The mechanism designer then determines Ih; I`; zh; z`; bh;  and . In turn, consumers
determine their demands for consumption goods c and d. Let edj denote the j-types
compensated (Hicksian) demand for d. The following Proposition, proved in Appendix
A, characterizes the optimal policy with respect to  and .40
Proposition 2 Let h` denote the marginal utility of income for the h`-mimicker. At
39 In focusing on the steady-state utilities we are nor suggesting that the welfare of agents on the
transition path does not matter. It is just that considering them does not change the points addressed
in our paper and makes the presentation more cumbersome. One can also rationalize our approach by
assuming a Millian social welfare function over undiscounted average utilities of all present and future
generations.
40Since our focus lies in assessing whether it is optimal or not to abide by the FR, we omit presenting
the expressions characterizing the optimal marginal income tax rates faced by high- and low-skilled
agents. These expressions are available upon request.
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the solution to the planners problem, the optimal values for  and  satisfy:
h`

dh`   d`

+ 
X
j
j


1 + r
+
j
1 + g

@ edj
@qj
= 0; (32)
h`

h`dh`   `d`

+ 
X
j
j


1 + r
+
j
1 + g

j
@ edj
@qj
 0; (33)
where (33) is satised as a strict equality if  > (g   r) = (1 + r).
Eq. (32) and inequality (33) implicitly characterize the optimal values for  and 
by means of a trade-o¤ between two e¤ects arising, respectively, from a compensated
marginal increase in  and .41 One is the e¤ects on the IC constraint, represented
by the -terms, and the other is public budget e¤ects, represented by the -terms.42
In particular, the -term in (32) shows that a marginal increase in  , coupled with an
o¤setting change in the nonlinear income tax schedule aimed at leaving unchanged the
utility of low-skilled agents, will adversely a¤ect the utility of a mimicker, and therefore
weaken the IC constraint, when dh` > d`. Instead, the -term in (33) shows that
a marginal increase in , coupled with an o¤setting change in the nonlinear income
tax schedule aimed at leaving unchanged the utility of low-skilled agents, will make a
mimicker worse o¤, and therefore weaken the IC constraint, when h`dh` > `d`.
We are now is a position to examine the optimality of the FR. To emphasize the role
played by nancial connectedness, we shall rst examine a setting without di¤erences in
nancial connectedness. This requires that two conditions are jointly satised: i) there
41A compensated marginal increase in  (or ) is dened as an increase in  (or ) accompanied by an
o¤setting change in the nonlinear income tax schedule such that the well-being of every non-mimicking
agents is left una¤ected. Formally, this requires adjusting zj by dzj = dj=(1 + r) when  is marginally
raised and by dzj = jdj=(1 + g) when  is marginally raised.
42 In reality, part of the -terms in (32)-(33) capture e¤ects on the money-injection constraint. How-
ever, due to the fact that an optimizing planner always chooses the policy instruments in such a way as
to achieve  =   (see the proof of Proposition 2 in Appendix A for details), one can re-interpret the
e¤ect on the money-injection constraint as a public-budget e¤ect. The fact that  =   tells us that at
a social optimum the planner is indi¤erent between raising the utility of type j-agents via a marginal
increase in zj or via a marginal increase in bj . This is due to the fact that, at the individual level, the
marginal rate of substitution between zj and bj is one; see equation (28).
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is no underlying heterogeneity in nancial sophistication among agents and ii) nancial
connectedness does not depend on an agents income.
5 The FR without di¤erences in nancial connectedness
Absent di¤erences in nancial connectedness, h = ` = h`  . It then follows
immediately from Proposition 2 that the optimal values of  and  are characterized by
one single relationship:

1 + r
+

1 + g
=
h`
 
d`   dh`

P
j 
j @ edj
@qj
:
This tells us that the optimal monetary growth rate is not unique. Social welfare is
maximized by a continuum of values for the monetary growth rate, , and the tax on
the second-period consumption,  (coupled with supporting income tax rates).
The intuition for this result comes from our earlier discussion on the redistributive
implications of the rate of money growth. If h = ` = h`  , the intertemporal
prices are the same across agents. Thus, by properly changing  the scal authority
can undo for all agents any e¤ect on q induced by a change in . More precisely (see
Appendix A for details), for any change in the money-injection rate one can always nd
a feasible adjustment in the tax rate on second-period consumption and the nonlinear
income tax that leaves everybodys welfare intact. An implication of this is that the
optimal monetary growth rate is not unique; a continuum of values satises it.
From the result above it also descends that, absent commodity taxation, one can
escape the instrument over-determination. Without  as a control variable, the scal
authority cannot neutralize the redistributive e¤ects of monetary growth rate. One
can then ask if in this case the FR is desirable. With  constrained to be equal to
zero, the governments optimization problem discussed in Section 4 is modied slightly.
Specically, exclude  from the set of policy instruments but otherwise keep the problem
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unchanged. This results in a characterization of optimal  given by:43
   (1 + g)
h`


 Pj j @ edj@qj 

dh`   d`

; (34)
where (34) is satised as an equality if its right-hand side is greater than (g   r) = (1 + r);
otherwise  = 0.
Assume now that the golden rule condition r = g is satised.44 From (24), this
means that  = i. Under this circumstance the optimality of the FR, i = 0, is the same
thing as the optimality of  = 0. It then follows from (34) that we will have the FR
satised as an interior solution if dh` = d` and as a corner solution if dh` < d`. The
rst case arises if preferences are weakly-separable in labor supply and goods.45 This
is of course a manifestation of the Atkinson-Stiglitz (1976) theorem. The second case
arises if labor supply and second-period consumption are complements so that dh` < d`.
Intuitively, a higher ination rate imposes on agents a utility loss that is proportional
to d; thus, absent di¤erences in nancial connectedness, dh` < d` implies that a higher
ination rate hurts a low-skilled agent more than a high-skilled mimicker, and therefore
is of no help in relaxing the IC constraint.
These results correspond to da Costa and Wernings (2008). In the latter paper, the
complementarity assumption concerned labor supply and real balances. However, given
43The optimization problem continues to be summarized by the Lagrangian (A1), but the optimization
is carried out with respect to Ih; I`; zh; z`; bh, and . Consequently, eq. (A7) disappears from the set
of rst-order conditions (A2)(A9); the rest of the equations remain as previously. This means that eq.
(A22), and with it eq. (A24), disappear. On the other hand, (A23) and thus (A25) remain. To sum up,
relationship (33) applies but in a simplied version with h = ` = h` and  = 0.
44As discussed in the introduction, in OLG models one can always exploit the di¤erence between the
real interest rate and the population growth rate to raise the steady-state welfare through intergen-
erational wealth transfers. Distortionary commodity taxes achieve this. An ination tax, is one such
mechanism. Yet, this reason for the suboptimality of the FR has nothing to do with the heterogeneity
of agents or with the existence of Mirrleesian taxes. Thus, to avoid distraction caused by this obvious
source of suboptimality, hereafter we assume that the economy is at the golden rule.
45This follows from the fact that with weakly-separable preferences, the h-type who pretends to be
an `-type and the `-type have identical after-tax incomes and identical marginal rates of substitution
between goods (independent of leisure). They also face the same prices for all goods including d (because
` = h`).
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that in our cash-in-advance constraint model, real balances are proportional to second-
period consumption expenditures, the two assumptions amount to the same thing. The
crucial point though is that the assumption is somewhat forced and unwarranted in our
model. Proposition 3 summarizes the results of this section.
Proposition 3 Assume that di¤erential productivities are the only source of hetero-
geneity and that nancial connectedness does not depend on earned income, so that
h = ` = h` = . In the steady-state equilibrium:
(i) The scal authority is able to neutralize the e¤ects of a change in . Under this
circumstance, the optimal monetary growth rate is not unique.
(ii) Set  = 0. At the golden rule, the optimal value of  = i is characterized by
relationship (34). Then:
(a) If preferences are weakly-separable in labor supply and goods, so that dh` = d`,
the FR is satised as an interior solution.
(b) If labor supply and second-period consumption are complements, so that dh` < d`,
the FR is satised as a corner solution.
(c) If labor supply and second-period consumption are substitutes, so that dh` > d`,
the FR is violated.
6 The FR with di¤erences in nancial connectedness
We now turn to examining the optimality of the FR when allowing for di¤erences in
nancial connectedness. As a basis for the discussion, Lemma 1, proved in Appendix
A, provides a characterization for the optimal  and the optimal .
26
Lemma 1 Let:
   

`   h
2
`h
@ ed`
@q`
@ edh
@qh
> 0; (35)
	 

h`dh`   `d`
0@ X
j
j
@ edj
@qj
1A
| {z }
>0
 

dh`   d`
0@ X
j
jj
@ edj
@qj
1A
| {z }
>0
; (36)
 

h`dh`   `d`
0@X
j
jj
@ edj
@qj
1A
| {z }
<0
 

dh`   d`
0@X
j
j
 
j
2 @ edj
@qj
1A
| {z }
<0
: (37)
where the indicated signs come from the fact that, with edj ; j = h; ` denoting compensated
demand, @ edj=@qj < 0. Then, at the golden rule when r = g:
 = (1= ) (1 + r)h`	; (38)
 = (1= ) (1 + r)h`; (39)
if the constraint  = i  0 is non-binding; otherwise, with a binding constraint, one has
a corner solution for  with,
 = 0; (40)
 =
 (1 + r)h`


 Pj j @ edj@qj 

dh`   d`

: (41)
As explained at the end of Section 2.1, building on Williamsons (2008) contribution,
we regard nancial connectedness as being jointly determined by the income earned by
a given individual and by his inherent degree of nancial sophistication, interpreted as
an individual characteristic distinct from earning ability but positively correlated with
it. With ` (I) > h (I) and j (I) decreasing in I, and considering that in equilibrium
I` < Ih (see footnote 38), it then immediately follows that `  `  I` > h  Ih  h.
When it comes to h`, we have the more-productive h-type person earning I`, the lower
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income of the less-productive `-type person. The two properties of j (I), j = `; h, then
imply that, `
 
I`

> h
 
I`

> h
 
Ih

, i.e.,
` > h` > h: (42)
Armed with Lemma 1, and in light of condition (42), we are now in a position to
examine the optimality of the FR when nancial connectedness matters.
Proposition 4 Assume individuals di¤er in productivities as well as in nancial con-
nectedness with ` > h` > h. In the golden rule steady-state equilibrium:
(a) If labor supply and second-period consumption are non-substitutes, so that dh` 6
d`, the FR is satised as a corner solution.
(b) If labor supply and second-period consumption are substitutes, so that dh` > d`,
the FR may or may not be violated. Specically, if h`dh`   `d`  0, then the FR is
again satised as a corner solution. On the other hand, if h`dh`   `d` > 0, the FR
may be satised as well as being violated.
Proof. To prove (a), rewrite 	 given by (36) as
	 

`d`   h`dh`
 
`
@ ed`
@q`
+ h
@ edh
@qh
!
 

d`   dh`
 
``
@ ed`
@q`
+ hh
@ edh
@qh
!
=

`   h`

`dh`
@ ed`
@q`
+
h
`   h

d`  

h`   h

dh`
i
h
@ edh
@qh
: (43)
Now ` > h` )  `   h >  h`   h. Consequently, with dh` 6 d`, [ `   h d`
   h`   h dh`]> 0 and 	 < 0. Hence, from Lemma 1, we have a corner solution for
.
To prove (b), consider the expression for	 in (36). With dh` > d`, if h`dh` `d` 6 0
then 	 < 0, and hence from Lemma 1, we have a corner solution for . On the other
hand, if h`dh`   `d` > 0, 	 can take a positive value so that the FR is violated; but
it can also take a non-positive value implying that the FR is satised. This is shown
through numerical examples in Appendix B.
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To shed light on the results of Proposition 4, observe rst that in general one wants
to use both instruments  and  ; each has its own advantage. This is best seen by
considering the optimal allocation that results under a general income tax when both
 and  are constrained to be zero. Then note the e¤ect on the IC constraint of a
compensated increase in , i.e. the e¤ect of introducing an ination tax coupled with
an o¤setting change in the nonlinear income tax schedule aimed at leaving unchanged
the utility of all non-mimicking agents. This requires supplementing d > 0 with dz` =
`d`
1+g d and dz
h = 
hdh
1+g d. For the reform to make the mimicker worse o¤, and therefore
relax the IC constraint, it must be that h`dh` > `d`. With ` > h`, this represents
a stronger condition than dh` > d`, which is the condition required for a compensated
increase in  to relax the IC constraint (the considered reform package would be in this
case d > 0 coupled with dz` = d
`
1+rd and dz
h = d
h
1+rd). The reason why we get a
more demanding condition is that an increase in  raises q` and qh` uniformly, whereas
an increase in  has the unattractive feature of raising q` more than qh`. This aspect
represents an advantage of acting on  , rather than violating the FR, as an instrument
to relax the IC constraint. At the same time, while  necessarily distorts q` and qh to
the same extent, an ination tax can generate any intended upward distortion on q`
(intended for the purpose of relaxing the IC constraint) with a smaller distortion on qh
(because ` > h). Given that any distortion on qh constitutes a pure e¢ ciency loss
(without benets in terms of relaxing the IC constraint), this aspect explains why, when
h`dh` > `d`, it might be desirable to violate the FR rather than to raise  , and this
despite the fact that violating the FR determines a regressive prole of second-period
consumption taxes.
Yet, whereas  can freely take either a positive or a negative value, this is not the
case with  which faces a lower bound of zero. This constraint on  implies that the
FR can only be violated if the required distortion is to set  at a positive value. Now
when dh`  d`, the distortion requires setting a negative value for ; hence satisfaction
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of the FR as a corner solution. The same is true with dh` > d` and h`dh`   `d` 6 0.
On the other hand, with h`dh`   `d` > 0, the distortion can go either way resulting
in the possibility of the FR being violated.
To summarize, when h`dh`   `d` > 0 both a commodity tax on second-period
consumption and an ination tax can be used as instruments to relax the binding IC
constraint. However, by distorting the intertemporal price of consumption, these policy
instruments entail an e¢ ciency cost in terms of foregone revenue due to substitution
e¤ects. Of the two instruments, while a commodity tax is more e¤ective as a mimicking-
deterring device, it also entails a larger e¢ ciency cost.46 Thus, when the latter e¤ect
dominates, an ination tax will be part of the optimal policy.
The comparison between the results of Proposition 4 with our earlier results in
Proposition 3 is illuminating. With or without di¤erences in nancial connectedness,
the FR holds if dh`  d`. On the other hand, whereas dh` > d` necessarily results in the
violation of the FR in the absence of di¤erences in nancial connectedness, this is not
the case when nancial connectedness di¤ers. Indeed, if dh` > d` but h`dh`  `d` 6 0,
the FR continues to be satised as a corner solution. And even if h`dh` `d` > 0, the
FR can still hold. Put di¤erently, nancial connectedness makes the case for the FR
stronger, limiting the possibilities for its violation. At the same, it does not require to
impose arbitrary assumptions on the structure of preferences as the condition dh`  d`
in the absence of di¤erences in nancial connectedness to ensure that it always holds.
46This is apparent by looking at eqs. (32)-(33) in Proposition 1 which implicitly provide the optimal
values for  and . In each equation, the -term captures a mimicking deterring e¤ect and the -term a
public budget e¤ect due to substitution e¤ects from changing the intertemporal price of consumption.
In eq. (32) the e¤ects are those arising from a marginal compensated increase in  , whereas in (33)
the e¤ects are those arising from a marginal compensated increase in . When h`dh`   `d` > 0 we
have that both the -term in (32) and the one in (33) take a positive sign, indicating that both a
marginal compensated increase in  and a marginal compensated increase in  deliver gains in terms of
mimicking-deterring e¤ects. However, since (0 <) h` < ` ( 1), we have that the gains generated by
acting on  are larger than those generated by raising . On the other hand, comparing the -terms in
(32) and (33), which represent the e¢ ciency cost (in terms of foregone revenue) due to the substitution
e¤ects induced by distorting the intertemporal price of consumption, we can see that the term appearing
in (33) is smaller (in absolute value) than the one in (32).
30
Finally, observe that the source of nancial connectedness also plays a role in the
results. To see this, consider two limit cases: (i) di¤erences in nancial connectedness are
only due to an underlying heterogeneity in nancial sophistication among agents (earned
income plays no role in itself); (ii) di¤erences in nancial connectedness are only due
to di¤erences in earned income (no underlying heterogeneity in nancial sophistication
among agents).47 Under (i), h` = h < ` which simplies (43) to
	 =

`   h

| {z }
>0
 
`dh`
@ ed`
@q`
+ hd`
@ edh
@qh
!
| {z }
<0
< 0:
Consequently, in this limit case, the FR is always optimal as a corner solution, and
the optimal value for  is determined according to eq. (41), and therefore sign () =
sign
 
dh`   d`. Under (ii), h` = ` > h simplifying (43) to
	 =

dh`   d`

`   h

| {z }
>0
 
 h@
edh
@qh
!
| {z }
>0
;
and therefore sign (	) = sign
 
dh`   d`, implying that it will be desirable to violate
the FR if dh` > d`. When this happens, the optimal value for  is determined according
to (39) and sign () = sign (). With h` = `, (37) simplies to
 =

dh`   d`

`   h

| {z }
>0
hh
@ edh
@qh| {z }
<0
;
which implies that sign () = sign
 
d`   dh`, and therefore  < 0.48
47 In the second case agents are only heterogeneous along one innate characteristic (earning ability),
although in equilibrium, since high-skilled agents earn more than low-skilled agents, the former end up
being more nancially connected than the latter.
48Notice that the optima  can never be positive when h` = `. We have in fact already established
that  < 0 when dh` > d`. On the other hand, if it were the case that dh`  d`, the FR would be
satised and sign () = sign
 
dh`   d`.
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Finally, notice that, leaving aside the limit case when h` = `, it is not necessarily
true that one should have  < 0 when it is desirable to violate the FR. This can be
easily seen by rewriting the expression for  given by (37) as
 

h`   `

``dh`
@ ed`
@q`
+
h
h   `

d`  

h   h`

dh`
i
hh
@ edh
@qh
;
and noticing that @=@h` = dh`
P
j=`;h 
jj @
edj
@qj
< 0. Thus, as h` lowers,  increases,
implying that the optimal  can either be positive or negative when it is desirable to
violate the FR.
7 Summary and conclusion
This paper has modeled an OLG economy à la Samuelson (1958) with money wherein
cash holdings are rationalized by a version of the Clower cash-in-advance constraint.
A distinguishing feature of the model is that it has allowed for agents to di¤er both
in terms of labor productivity and in terms of nancial connectedness. Some agents
are more skilled and more nancially connected than others. This means that they
not only have a higher earning ability, but also require a proportionately smaller cash
reserve to mediate their expenditures. Money supply increases, or contracts, at a xed
rate per year through lump-sum money transfers to individuals. The government has
information on individuals incomes and anonymous expenditures; allowing it to levy
nonlinear income and linear commodity taxes. Within this framework, the paper has
studied the nature of the economys equilibrium as well as its steady state. It has
also characterized the informationally constrained Pareto-e¢ cient allocations of this
economy, and has investigated if these allocations satisfy the FR.
The paper has established a link between optimal monetary policy and the reach
of scal authoritys tax instruments. It has found that Mirrleesian taxes can fully
neutralize the redistributive e¤ects of monetary policy only if agents do not di¤er in
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nancial connectedness. In this case, there will exist instrument over-determination.
That is, the optimal monetary growth rate is not unique; a continuum of values satises
it (supported by o¤setting tax instruments).
With di¤erences in nancial connectedness, the over-determinacy disappears and
the optimal policy is characterized by a unique commodity tax rate and a unique mone-
tary growth rate. It also results in the FR being quite robust without having to impose
arbitrary assumptions on the structure of preferences (though almost always as a corner
solution). Yet if labor supply and second-period consumption are substitutes, it might
be optimal to violate the FR, and this despite the fact that the government aims at
redistributing from the high-skilled agents to the low-skilled agents and the fact that
violating the FR determines a regressive prole of second-period consumption taxes.
However, for the FR to be violated, substitutability between labor supply and second-
period consumption is not a su¢ cient condition; one also needs that the di¤erences in
nancial connectedness are to a su¢ ciently large extent explained by di¤erences in in-
come rather than by an underlying heterogeneity in nancial sophistication (interpreted
as an individual characteristic correlated with earning ability but distinct from it).
The intuition for this result comes from the fact that, even when an ination tax can
help relaxing the binding incentive-compatibility constraint faced by the government in
the design of the income tax schedule, a commodity tax represents a more powerful
instrument for mimicking-deterring purposes. On the other hand, the e¢ ciency costs
(in terms of foregone revenue for the government) due to the substitution e¤ects are
lower when the intertemporal price of consumption is distorted through an ination
tax rather than through a commodity tax. When the latter e¤ects dominates, which
happens when the di¤erences in nancial connectedness are to a su¢ ciently large ex-
tent explained by di¤erences in income rather than by an underlying heterogeneity in
nancial sophistication, violating the FR becomes desirable.
To conclude, we should emphasize that the paper has completely ignored the macro-
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economic issues associated with monetary and scal policies. Questions such as stabi-
lization, unemployment, sticky prices, and the like have not been touched in this study
not because they are unimportant, but simply because they are outside the purview of
the current study.49
49Some of these issues are discussed by Correia et al. (2008) in a dynamic Ramsey setting. They
show that sticky prices are irrelevant for the conduct of monetary policy if scal instruments are not
restricted.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 2: Using vj to denote v
 
qj ; yj ; Ij=wj

and vjk to denote
v
 
qjk; yk; Ik=wj

, the mechanism designers problem can be summarized by means of
the Kuhn-Tucker Lagrangian:
L =
X
j=`;h
jvj + 
24X
j=`;h
j

Ij   zj + 
1 + r
dj

  R
35 (A1)
+ 
X
j=`;h
j

bj   
1 + g
jdj

+ 

vh   vh`

;
with the non-negativity constraint    g r1+r  0. The rst-order conditions associated
with Lagrangian (A1) are:
@L
@Ih
=

h + 
@vh
@Ih
+
@vh
@qh
@qh
@h
@h
@Ih

+ h
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1 +

1 + r

@dh
@Ih
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@dh
@qh
@qh
@h
@h
@Ih

   
h
1 + g

h
@dh
@Ih
+

h
@dh
@qh
@qh
@h
+ dh

@h
@Ih

= 0; (A2)
@L
@I`
= `

@v`
@I`
+
@v`
@q`
@q`
@`
@`
@I`

  

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@I`
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@qh`
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@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@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@I`

+ `

1 +

1 + r

@d`
@I`
+
@d`
@q`
@q`
@`
@`
@I`

   
`
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
`
@d`
@I`
+

`
@d`
@q`
@q`
@`
+ d`

@`
@I`

= 0; (A3)
@L
@zh
=

h + 
 @vh
@yh
+ 

 h + 
h
1 + r
@dh
@yh

  
hh
1 + g
@dh
@yh
= 0; (A4)
@L
@z`
= `
@v`
@y`
  @v
h`
@y`
+ 

 ` + 
`
1 + r
@d`
@y`

  
``
1 + g
@d`
@y`
= 0; (A5)
@L
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=

h + 
 @vh
@yh
+ 
h
1 + r
@dh
@yh
+ 

h   
hh
1 + g
@dh
@yh

= 0; (A6)
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=
X
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j
@vj
@
+ 

@vh
@
  @v
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@

+

1 + r
X
j
j

dj + 
@dj
@

   
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X
j
jj
@dj
@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(A7)
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@
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X
j
j
@vj
@
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
@vh
@
  @v
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@

   1
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X
j
jj

dj + 
@dj
@

+

1 + r
X
j
j
@dj
@
 0; (A8)
   g   r
1 + r

@L
@
= 0; (A9)
where comparing equation (A4) with (A6) reveals that  =  :
Now substitute for i from (24) in (29) to get
qjk =
1
1 + r
+ jk

1
1 + g
  1
1 + r

+

1 + r
+
jk
1 + g
: (A10)
Di¤erentiate equations (31) and (A10) with respect to  and  to get
@qj
@
=
@qjk
@
=
1
1 + r
; (A11)
@qj
@
=
j
1 + g
; (A12)
@qjk
@
=
jk
1 + g
: (A13)
Using @dj=@ =
 
@dj=@qj
  
@qj=@

and @dj=@ =
 
@dj=@qj
  
@qj=@

, one nds
@dj
@
=
1
1 + r
@dj
@qj
; (A14)
@dj
@
=
j
1 + g
@dj
@qj
(A15)
Let j and jk denote the j- and jk-type agentsmarginal utility of income:
@vj
@zj
j;;bj ;Ij =
@vj
@bj
j;;zj ;Ij =
@vj
@yj
jqj ;Ij  j ;
@vjk
@zk
j;;bk;Ik =
@vjk
@bk
j;;zk;Ik =
@vjk
@yk
jqjk;Ik  jk:
Di¤erentiate vj and vjk with respect to  and . Using equations (A11)(A13) and
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Roys identity to simplify these derivatives yields,
@vj
@
j;bj ;zj ;Ij =
@vj
@qj
jyj ;Ij
@qj
@
j =  
jdj
1 + r
; (A16)
@vjk
@
j;bk;zk;Ik =
@vjk
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jyk;Ik
@qjk
@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jkdjk
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; (A17)
@vj
@
j;bj ;zj ;Ij =
@vj
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@qj
@
j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jjdj
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; (A18)
@vjk
@
j;bk;zk;Ik =
@vjk
@qjk
jyk;Ik
@qjk
@
j =  
jkjkdjk
1 + g
: (A19)
Finally, use the result that  =   and equations (A14)(A19) to simplify and reduce
the rst-order conditions (A4)-(A5) and (A7)-(A8) into the following equations:

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
h + h

h
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+
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
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@yh
  h = 0; (A20)
``   h` + `

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jj
@dj
@qj
1A  0; (A23)
where (A23) is satised as an equality if  > (g   r) = (1 + r).
Now multiply equation (A20) by dh and equation by (A21) d`, then add the resulting
two equations to (A22) to get
h`

dh`   d`

+ 
24 
1 + r
X
j

j
@dj
@qj
+ jdj
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
jj
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+ j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@dj
@yj
35 = 0:
(A24)
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Let edj denote the compensated version of dj . Then use the Slutsky equation to rewrite
the above equation as (32) in the text.
Then multiply equation (A20) by hdh; and equation (A21) by `d`, and add the
resulting two equations to (A23) to get

24 
1 + r
X
j

jj
@dj
@qj
+ jjdj
@dj
@yj

+

1 + g
X
j

j
 
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2 @dj
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+ j
 
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2
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@dj
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35
+ h`

h`dh`   `d`

 0; (A25)
where (A25) is satised as an equality if  > (g   r) = (1 + r). Using the Slutsky equa-
tion, one can rewrite (A25) as (33) in the text.
Policy over-determination when there are no di¤erences in nancial connect-
edness: Observe rst that with j = , from (31), qj simplies to
q =
1
1 + r
+ 

1
1 + g
  1
1 + r

+

1 + r
+

1 + g
: (A26)
Consider now, starting from any initial values for  and , a change in the growth rate
of money equal to d while o¤setting it with a corresponding change in  that keeps q
constant. It follows from (A26) that one has to set
d =
1 + r
1 + g
( d) ; (A27)
in order to have dq = 0:
Next observe that the change in  induces a change in bj as well. As in the Proof
of Proposition 1, let the scal authority also change zj according to dzj =  dbj . This
change ensures that dyj = dzj + dbj = 0: With dyj = dqj = 0 and no change in Ij ; the
instituted changes leave the utility of the h-types and the `-types intact. Observe also
that the utility of potential mimickers, the jk-agents, remain una¤ected as they continue
to face the same price and income vector
 
q; yk; Ik

. Consequently, the IC constraints
continue to be satised. Thus, if the considered changes do not violate the governments
38
budget constraint, they constitute a feasible change that leaves every agent just as well
o¤ as initially.
To check that the governments budget constraint is not violated, note that with 
q; yj ; Ij

remaining unchanged, the j-types demand for d does not change either.
With ddj = 0, the change in the governments net tax revenue is, from the steady-state
version of (20),
dR =  

hdzh + `dz`

+
d
1 + r
X
j
jdj :
Substituting  dbj for dzj and the value of d from (A27) in above, we get
dR = hdbh + `db`   d
1 + g
X
j
jdj : (A28)
Now note that the changes in  and bj must satisfy the money injection constraint
equation (27). Given that ddj = 0; we have
hdbh + `db` =

P
j 
jdj
1 + g
d: (A29)
Substituting from (A29) into (A28) results in dR = 0:
Proof of Lemma 1: Write equation (32) and the equality version of (33) in matrix
form as P
j 
j @ edj
@qj
P
j 
jj @
edj
@qjP
j 
jj @
edj
@qj
P
j 
j
 
j
2 @ edj
@qj
! 

1+r

1+g
!
=
 1


h`
 
dh`   d`
h`
 
h`dh`   `d`

: (A30)
The determinant of the 2 2 matrix in the left-hand side of (A30) is
X
j
j
@ edj
@qj
X
j
j
 
j
2 @ edj
@qj
 
0@X
j
jj
@ edj
@qj
1A2 = `h@ ed`
@q`
@ edh
@qh

`   h
2
;
which is positive since edj denote the j-types compensated (Hicksian) demand for second
period consumption, so that @ edj=@qj represents the own-price substitution e¤ect and is
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therefore negative. Premultiplying (A30) by the inverse of the 2 2 matrix, and using
the notation    `h @ ed`
@q`
@ edh
@qh
 
`   h2, yields 

1+r

1+g
!
=
 1
 
 P
j 
j
 
j
2 @ edj
@qj
 Pj jj @ edj@qj
 Pj jj @ edj@qj Pj j @ edj@qj
!
h`
 
dh`   d`
h`
 
h`dh`   `d`

=
h`
 
"
   dh`   d`Pj j  j2 @ edj@qj +  h`dh`   `d`Pj jj @ edj@qj 
dh`   d`Pj jj @ edj@qj    h`dh`   `d`Pj j @ edj@qj
#
:
Or
 =
(1 + r)h`
 
;
 =
(1 + g)h`
 
	;
which lead to (39)(38) when r = g.
Appendix B: Numerical examples
Assume we are at a steady state and that skilled and unskilled workers have identical
preferences represented by
u = 10

ln c+
1
95
d0:95

  L
2000
(L+ d) : (B1)
Observe that in this example uLd < 0 so that labor supply and future goods are (Edge-
worth) substitutes. Further, regarding their cash-in-advance constraints, assume that
j (I), j = `; h, is decreasing in I with the following structure:
j (I) = 1  jIj=j ; j  1; j > 0;
with ` < h so that ` (I) > h (I). The government has a (weighted) utilitarian
objective function
P
j=`;h 
jvj , where j denotes the welfare weights, with ` > h. Set
h = 0:6 and ` = 0:4 so that sixty percent of workers are skilled and forty percent
unskilled. Their real wage rates, reecting their productivities, are set equal to wh = 4
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and w` = 2. Assume further that r = g = 0:4 and that h = 0:4 and ` = 0:6. As far as
the governments external revenue is concerned, we set R = 0 so that optimal taxes are
purely redistributive. Finally, let ` = 0:00005, while h and j are allowed to vary.
(i) The FR is violated:
Set h = ` = 1:2 and h = 0:0003. This yields the following solution for the tax
instruments and the rate of monetary growth:
 =  0:1610;  = i = 0:3163; T 0

Ih

=  0:0228; T 0

I`

= 0:4772:
Given the money injection rate of 31:63% and the population growth rate of 40%, one
calculates ' =  0:0598. That is, the price level is falling at a rate of 5:98% per period.
Observe also that the marginal income tax rate faced by skilled workers is non-zero, a
result that is due to the presence of other policy instruments besides income taxation.50
The policy instruments result in the following values for the arguments of the utility
function and real money balances:
ch = 259:035; dh = 107:654; Lh = 100:377; yh = 339:770; xh = 61:095; bh = 6:421;
c` = 137:996; d` = 64:980; L` = 43:021; y` = 191:486; x` = 31:306; b` = 29:253:
Implementing the optimal allocation by the government implies ` = 0:9913; h` =
0:9476, and h = 0:6670.51
50The no-distortion at the top result requires that the labor supply of the top skilled agents, type h
in our model, be globally undistorted. When the nonlinear income tax is the only policy instrument,
the result requires setting the marginal income tax rate faced by top skilled workers to zero. When
additional policy instruments are available, the result requires that the marginal e¤ective tax rate faced
by top skilled workers is driven to zero. This in general requires that their marginal income tax rate
should not be set to zero (see, for instance, Edwards et al., 1994).
51While in this example  < 0, this is not a general result. One can generate examples of both  and 
being positive. For example, setting h = ` = 1:2 and h = 0:0006 yields:  = 0:0187;  = i = 0:1141.
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(ii) The FR holds:
Set h = ` = 1 and h = 0:0006. Under this circumstance, we get,
 = 0:0751;  = i = 0; T 0

Ih

= 0:0062; T 0

I`

= 0:4806:
In this example, the FR is this time satised as a corner solution with  being the
only instrument used to a¤ect the price of d. With no increase in money supply and a
population growth rate of 40%, the price level is falling at a rate of 28:57% per period.
The policy instruments result in the following values for the arguments of the utility
function and real money balances:
ch = 262:656; dh = 102:254; Lh = 100:214; yh = 341:180; xh = 57:566; bh =  2:094;
c` = 129:626; d` = 74:902; L` = 42:693; y` = 187:147; x` = 50:132; b` = 3:142:
Implementing the optimal allocation by the government in this case implies ` =
0:9957; h` = 0:9488, and h = 0:7595.
Appendix C: Observability of individual consumption levels
Let  j denote the tax rate levied on the second-period consumption of individuals
of type j. This changes the expression for qj in (31) to
qj =
1
1 + r
+ j

1
1 + g
  1
1 + r

+
 j
1 + r
+
j
1 + g
: (B1)
It follows from this expression that if the scal authority changes  j by
d j =  j 1 + r
1 + g
d; (B2)
dqj = 0 whenever the monetary authority changes  by d: Moreover, observe again
that the change in  induces a change in bj as well. As in the Proof of Proposition 1, let
the scal authority also change zj according to dzj =  dbj : This change ensures that
dyj = dzj + dbj = 0: With dyj = dqj = 0 and no change in Ij ; the instituted changes
leave the utility of the h-types and the `-types intact.
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To check resource feasibility, observe rst that with
 
qj ; yj ; Ij

remaining unchanged,
the j-types demand for d does not change either. With ddj = 0, the change in the
governments net tax revenue is, from the steady-state version of (20), while substituting
 j for  ;  dbj for dzj ; and the value of d j from (B2)
dR = hdbh + `db`   1
1 + g
X
j=`;h
jjdjd: (B3)
As in the exercises in the text, the changes in  and bj must satisfy the money injection
constraint equation (27). Given that ddj = 0; we have
X
j=`;h
jdbj =
1
1 + g
X
j=`;h
jjdjd: (B4)
Substituting from (B4) into (B3) results in dR = 0:
It remains for us to check the IC constraints. To that end, consider the expression
that one gets for qjk when substitutes k for  in (A10). We have
qjk =
1
1 + r
+ jk

1
1 + g
  1
1 + r

+
k
1 + r
+
jk
1 + g
: (B5)
It then follows from (B5) and (B2) that a change in  accompanied by a change in k
that keeps qk constant, changes qjk by
dqjk =
dk
1 + r
+
jkd
1 + g
=
 
jk   k d
1 + g
:
As a result, the utility of a jk-mimicker will change according to
dvjk =
@vjk
@qjk
dqjk =  jkdk
 
jk   k d
1 + g
:
where jk denotes the jk-mimickers marginal utility of income. Now if jk   k > 0
setting d > 0 implies that dvjk < 0 and if jk   k < 0 setting d < 0 implies
that dvjk < 0: Either way, the jk-mimicker can be made worse o¤ allowing a Pareto-
improving move.
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The upshot of this discussion is that if jk   k > 0 a reform that sets d > 0
and changes qjk according to the above relationship will make the jk-mimicker worse
o¤ and allows a Pareto-improving move. On the other hand, if jk   k < 0 a reform
that sets d < 0 allows a Pareto-improving move. Consequently, given this information
structure, scal policy becomes overarching and one would want to either keep inating
the economy or deating it. Now, given the pattern of binding IC constraint, the relevant
sign for us is that of h`   ` which we know is negative. Consequently, a deationary
reform of the type described always increases welfare, resulting in the optimality of the
Friedman rule as a limit solution due to the constraint on the non-negativity of the
nominal interest rate.
Finally, observe that the indeterminacy problem we have mentioned in the text does
not arise here despite the fact that we are enabling the scal authority to neutralize the
redistributive e¤ects of the monetary policy. The reason for this is that, this informa-
tional structure allows scal authority to achieve even more. It can even determine the
virtualprice qjk thus being able to play with IC constraints.
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